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REVIEWS
 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani­
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond and by this proclama­I 
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Stephen R. L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast: Are 
Animals Moral? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, 
vii + 127 pp., f7.95 
We are animals, of a sort, even 
though we may sometimes lose sight of 
this fact. The subtitle, therefore, 
should not lead us to suppose that the 
book is about the morality of nonhu­
man animals only. Dr. Clark philoso­
phizes against an ethological back­
ground, endeavouring to relate the 
morality of both humans and nonhu­
mans to our biological nature and evo­
Iutiona ry legacy. He adopts a revi sed 
but basically Aristotelian ethical 
stance, holding that morality is ulti­
mately grounded in· the sort of being 
one is with one's inherent ends. Yet, 
while ethology and sociobiology can 
shed considerable light on what sort 
of beings we are, they cannot provide 
a moral system or definitive moral 
conclusions. The fact that a given 
gene or form of behaviou r has evolved 
does not mean that it is morally 
superior. The best we can hope for 
is "that the whole natu ral system has 
been made [by God] in such a way 
that evol utiona ry logic wi II lead to 
creatures of a moral kind" (p. 103). 
Clark begins by criticizing the too 
atomistic and abstracted approach of 
much of modern science, advocating 
that we make wider use of an 
Aristotelian approach. Instead of 
being concerned exclusively with 
abstract ideal models, which particu­
larize things and artificially tear them 
from the sur ro un din g s of whi c h they 
are necessarily a part, we must turn 
to observation of real things in their 
natural whole environment. Biological 
complexity is such that ideal models 
can tell us little about real beings. 
Moreover, he argues against the 
behaviou rist dogma. that we must 
never attempt to understand animals 
in terms of emotions and intentions. 
Sometimes this gives us the greatest 
overall understanding of what is going 
on. To be sure, there is the stand­
ing problem that an understanding in 
terms of emotions and intentions may 
be as misleading as other sorts of 
models. This is not a problem we can 
resolve by denying the reality from 
wh ich it spri ngs. We ca n not ade­
quately understand humans or beasts 
if we repudiate any understanding of 
thei r inner life. 
The author goes on to consider 
such topics as intelligence and lan­
guage, freedom and necessity, me and 
mine (focusing on self-awaremess), 
altruism, sexuality, parenthood, 
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territory and dominance, ending with 
a discussion of moral issues and his 
conclusions. One of the conclusions 
reached is that beasts a re ethical 
since "they respond to aspects of a 
situation and to features of their kin,.. 
dred, that a good man also would 
respect. But they are not moral: for 
they do not ... moralize ... or construct 
intellectua I systems ... ' (p. 107) . 
Certainly some animals sometimes act 
from motivations which are morally 
relevant and appropriate, though they 
do not construct to comprehend ethical 
systems. (While agreeing with Clark's 
conclusion, I would prefer to revise 
the terminology and say that beasts 
sometimes act as moral agents but .are 
not aware of moral principle.) Lack­
ing human levels of self-awareness, 
rationality, and freedom, nonhuman 
animals are not only unmoved by moral 
principle, they have a much narr,ower 
range of eth.i:callysignificant options. 
With both ,humans and beasts, our 
ethical or moral motivations are only a 
paTt ·ofou,r bei,ng and must be under­
stood in terms of the whole individuail. 
It is argued, that much of ou r 
thinking about beasts and animals is 
infected with terminological and con­
ceptual muddles. Terms such asdom­
inance and aggression, for instance, 
are used in ways which are neither 
colloqu iallysatisfactory, norconcep­
tually precise (not even in a merely 
behaviou risticsense) . One of the 
cardinal conceptual sins is confusing 
thefu nction ofabehaviou rwith its 
goal. The question of whya behavior 
w,asselected by evolution is disti net 
from the question of what the hehav­
iOLi r means tothebei ngin q,UJ~stion.
For 'instance, . "when a [male]harnadr­
yas babQon adopts :a youngfemal,e the 
eventual result may be the creation of 
a'ha rem', but we h.ave no strong rea­
'son to think that the baboon intends 
more th'an the adoption of a ch iId, the 
becomi ngofa 'mother'" (p .84) . 
The above quote illustrates another 
feature of the book: while thought 
provoking and refreshingly different, 
it often do~s not go into enough detail 
and depth to be quite convincing. In 
this instance there is an obvious 
question which cries in vain for an 
answer: why, if the adoption of a 
child is the sole m()tivation, does the 
male baboon adopt only female chil­
dren? Perhaps there is a convincing 
answer, but Ciark does not even 
acknowledge the question. Another 
example of this shortcoming is found 
in th.e discussion of the famous incest 
taboo: "Th~' b~n on incest ... does 
not rest on the supposedly bad effects 
of inbreeding : in fact, such bad 
effects a r.e rather a consequence of 
th.epan th,a,n its cause-for any ha rm­
ful r:ecessivegenes would be elimi­
nated from the gene pool in a very 
few generations of inbreeding" (p. 
72). For one thing, this leaves out 
of accou nt the possible advantages of 
heterozygosity, thepai ring of differ­
ent 9~nes. ThJ.s may be an advantage 
even when none of the genes in ques­
tion i,s particularly harmful. It is 
regrettable that Clark's stimulating 
idea:s and valuable insights are too 
often weakened by such lack of fol­
low-through. It is not as if the book 
were ,already to()long to admit of fu r­
therdevelopment. While complaining, 
I shou Id add that the footnotes refer 
us only to particular works, not to 
specific pages. I sometimes fou nd 
th is' Jrustrati ng. 
"The central problem of mammals", 
in Clark's analysis, "is-what to do 
with the males?" (p. 74). Various 
ev.oJ,utiona ry attempts to solve this 
problem, pr toga'in benefit from it, 
ha\{e ,contribute9'heavilyto the devel­
op~,ent of mammalian social systems 
and in particul.ar to the development 
ofh"uman cultqres. From studying 
beasts we can gain insights not only 
into how they organize their lives, 
hut into the. possibilities for us and 
the constraints upon us. Ultimately, 
Cla,r,k argues . for a modernized 
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Aristotelian style social and political ations. Biology only cannot generate 
philosophy, placing the emphasis on ethical or political systems. Clark 
small managable groups. These advocates his views as being consis­-
groups are to be small enough and tent with biology on one hand and 
managed in such a way as to allow us morality on the other. 
to Iive consistently with the demands 
of human nature. They are to be In this book I found an array of 
largely organized around women, the interesting facts, thought-provoking 
true centers of social life (a very arguments, and stimulating ideas. In 
un-Aristotelian element). Clark rec­- spite of my stated reservations, I 
ognizes that such a scheme does not warmly recommend the book as well 
follow from pu rely biological consider- worth the reading. 
Lawrence E. Johnson
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